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Measuring Statehood on a Sub-National Level: A Dialogue among Methods
Angela Heucher, Luisa Linke-Behrens, and Leon Schettler
Abstract:
Statehood can vary greatly within and across countries. For this reason, we find it problematic 
that the national level most often serves as the main unit of analysis when measuring 
statehood, thereby neglecting the sub-national level. To address this shortcoming, the 
authors of this working paper present five options for measuring statehood on a sub-national 
level, asking: What are the advantages and disadvantages of different methods to measuring and 
comparing statehood on a sub-national level? 
All contributions proceed in three steps, each discussing i) data sources, as well as methods 
for data collection and analysis, ii) illustrative examples, and iii) the advantages and challenges 
to each respective approach. While there is no silver bullet for collecting and analyzing data 
on statehood, we find that a combination of different methods is particularly promising for 
achieving more fine-grained results and a more complete picture of statehood on the sub-
national level.
Zusammenfassung:
Staatlichkeit kann innerhalb und zwischen Ländern stark variieren. Deswegen finden wir es 
problematisch, dass die Messung von Staatlichkeit zumeist auf der nationalen Ebene ansetzt, 
wohingegen die sub-nationale Ebene vernachlässigt wird. Hieran anknüpfend stellen wir fünf 
Wege zur Messung von Staatlichkeit auf sub-nationaler Ebene vor und fragen: Was sind die 
Vor- und Nachteile verschiedener Methoden um Staatlichkeit auf sub-nationaler Ebene zu messen 
und zu vergleichen?
Alle Beiträge gehen dabei auf drei Aspekte ein: i) Datenquellen, sowie Methoden der 
Datenerhebung und -auswertung; ii) Anwendungsbeispiele, und iii) Vorteile sowie 
Herausforderungen des jeweiligen Ansatzes. Während es keinen Königsweg gibt um Daten 
zu Staatlichkeit zu sammeln und auszuwerten, erscheint uns gerade die Kombination 
verschiedener Methoden vielversprechend um Staatlichkeit auf sub-nationaler Ebene zu 
messen.
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1. Introduction1
By Angela Heucher, Luisa Linke-Behrens, and Leon Schettler
The concept of statehood drives our understanding of and analytical approach to contemporary 
phenomena in International Relations (IR). Both practitioners and academics have delved into 
the topic of statehood, as is evident in the vast literature surrounding failing or failed states 
(Lambach/Bethke 2012; Rotberg 2003, 2004; Schneckener 2004; Zartman 1995). In this working 
paper, we build on the observation that consolidated states in the Westphalian sense are not the 
rule, but rather that areas of limited statehood are characteristic for most parts of the world (Risse 
2011a). As statehood can vary immensely within official state boundaries, we base our research on 
territorial, social, and sectoral areas of limited statehood as units of analysis. In our understanding 
of statehood, we follow the definition set forth by the “Collaborative Research Center 700 – 
Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood”. Accordingly, two components are constitutive of 
statehood, namely (a) the ability to control the means of violence (henceforth: monopoly of force) 
and (b) the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions (henceforth: administrative 
capacity) (Draude et al. 2012; Risse 2007, 2012). Through this minimalistic conceptualization and 
the analytical distinction between statehood and governance2, one can investigate governance 
activities by different types of actors including but not limited to the state (Krasner/Risse 2014; 
Risse 2011b). 
The literature on measuring statehood is rich and draws on different data sources. Lee et 
al. (2014), for instance, use both the Political Instability Task Force’s (PITF) data set and data 
from the Institutional Profile Database (IPD) on fiscal capacity to capture challenges to the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force and to measure the ability to enforce rules and regulations, 
respectively. Schäferhoff relies on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) for evidence 
of the state’s monopoly on the use of force and as concerns basic administration (2013). Others 
employ indicators in the dimensions of coercive, extractive, and regulatory power (Soifer 2006, 
2008; Soifer/vom Hau 2008). These analyses draw on different methods ranging from qualitative 
expert assessments (e.g. BTI and IPD) to annual, quantitative data (e.g. PITF). Overall, scholarly 
debates and attempts to measure statehood have proven quite fruitful and have furthered our 
understanding in this regard immensely. Yet, we see a challenge in “methodological nationalism” 
(Risse 2011a; Zürn 2002), with the national level most often acting as the main unit of analysis. 
This gives the misleading impression of a uniform presence of state authority across the entire 
territory, when, in fact, statehood can vary greatly within one country and across countries – 
which is why we find this trend problematic. While there are numerous research questions 
that can be addressed by drawing on national-level data, we also find that there are numerous 
research questions that cannot be answered comprehensively without explicitly taking the sub-
1 This paper is the product of the workshop “Residual Statehood on a Sub-National Level and Governance 
by External Actors” in Berlin, November 13, 2015. The workshop took place at the Collaborative Research 
Center (SFB 700) “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood”, which is funded by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG). We thank the DFG for its continuous support. The authors further wish to thank 
Bernhard Metz (World Bank) for his valuable comments on early versions of the paper’s contributions.
2 Defined as “institutionalized modes of social coordination aiming at the provision of collectively 
binding rules and the delivery of services” Draude et al. (2012).
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national level into account. In an attempt to overcome this shortcoming in the discussion on 
statehood, we discuss a variety of options for measuring statehood on a sub-national level in 
this working paper. In this respect, this paper seeks to answer the following research question: 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of different methods to measure and compare statehood on 
a sub-national level?
To answer this question, this working paper presents several ways to measure and compare 
statehood on the sub-national level, each developed and applied by researchers working at 
the Collaborative Research Center (for other approaches cp. Harbers 2015; Schäferhoff 2013; 
Soifer 2006). In doing so, we explicitly address the practical difficulties that arise with this task. 
Above all, reliable data on sub-national or even cross-regional degrees of statehood are a rarity, 
and their collection is inherently complex, especially as concerns issues of time, resources, 
territorial access, and security. But precisely because of these difficulties, we hold that reflecting 
upon which methods allow for analysis on the sub-national level – and which do not – is long 
overdue. 
All five contributions develop their approach in three steps. First, they present the method 
used to measure statehood. This comprises the data sources and the methods for data collection, 
as well as methods for data analysis, with each contribution focusing on those methodical 
issues most relevant to their individual approach. The authors continue by illustrating their 
measurements with examples from their empirical research in areas of limited statehood. 
Finally, they discuss the advantages of and challenges to their approaches, reflecting upon that 
which their respective approaches allows them to observe of sub-national statehood. While all 
authors address these three aspects separately, some of the challenges can be overcome precisely 
by integrating or combining different methods. The contributions are ordered by the degree of 
aggregation, starting with the meso level and proceeding to the micro level. Eric Stollenwerk 
employs a quantitative measurement of statehood on the level of federal states in Nigeria, based 
on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Nigerian 
National Bureau of Statistics on theft. Luisa Linke-Behrens presents an alternative quantitative 
measure of statehood, also using ACLED-data but drawing both on indicators different from 
those used by Stollenwerk and on data on the size of the public service from Tanzania’s 
National Bureau of Statistics. Angela Heucher and Leon Schettler conduct a qualitative content 
analysis of international organizations’ official documents and expert interviews, conducted 
at headquarter and country level, to explore organizational perceptions of statehood. Using 
geo-referenced data including satellite imagery, Lisa Pech highlights how a perspective from 
(high) above is able to unravel how land-use and statehood change in the Kivu province in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Tim Glawion contrasts the perspective from above with 
a bottom-up approach, using qualitative tools, such as participant observation and interviews in 
Somaliland and the Central African Republic. 
This working paper, we believe, offers a rich and diverse menu of possibilities for measuring 
statehood on a sub-national level. Most importantly, this menu opens up unique pathways to 
further explore the relationship between statehood and governance. For example, we know that 
the degree of statehood and the degree of the provision of public goods and services do not 
correspond as strongly as has been asserted in the past – at least with regard to the national level 
(Lee et al. 2014). Yet, we do not know how this relationship manifests itself on the sub-national 
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or local level or which features of statehood might be most important for the effectiveness of 
alternative governance actors. In sum, this working paper strives to lay the groundwork for 
future multi-methodical research on measuring and comparing statehood in areas of limited 
statehood throughout the world.
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2. Measuring Statehood on the Sub-National Level in Nigeria
By Eric Stollenwerk
Statehood has been a key concept in the social sciences for many decades (see e.g. Lane 1979; 
Levi 1988; Tilly 1990). However, despite its prominent role, measuring statehood has remained 
a conceptual and methodological challenge (D’Arcy/Nistotskaya 2016; Hendrix 2010). Most of 
the commonly used statehood measurements focus on country-level data and thereby allow 
for important but limited perspectives on statehood (Bertelsmann Foundation 2016; Hendrix 
2010; Lee et al. 2014; Teorell et al. 2016). Statehood has two components: the state’s ability to 
control the means of violence, and its ability to make and implement rules (cf. the definition of 
statehood in the introduction); however, degrees of statehood vary both between countries and 
within a nation. While one region of a country may display a fairly high level of statehood, other 
regions may display much lower degrees of statehood. Yet, there are hardly any measurements 
available that allow for sub-national assessment of statehood. This is particularly the case for 
areas of limited statehood and for quantitative data. This contribution to this working paper 
uses a quantitative approach to measure statehood on the sub-national level for Nigeria as an 
area of limited statehood. It introduces a new measure, which captures the degree of statehood 
for the different Nigerian federal states and thus allows for a look into the black box of the state, 
revealing sub-national statehood variation within Nigeria. 
Areas of limited statehood present a particular challenge to measuring statehood on the 
sub-national level for at least two reasons. First, it has been noted in past research that data 
availability and quality in areas of limited statehood are often problematic (see Jerven 2013). 
Second, statehood on the sub-national level might shift significantly over time, for example due 
to violent conflicts that challenge the state’s monopoly of force (see Hagmann/Péclard 2011). 
Thus, capturing such changes adequately is another challenge to any data collection effort. Both 
challenges render measuring statehood on the sub-national level in areas of limited statehood 
complex but not impossible.
Nigeria is a most interesting case in point. Statehood patterns within Nigeria have shifted 
many times in the country’s history (Falola/Heaton 2008). The severe violent conflicts in some 
parts of the northern states, after introducing Sharia law in 2001, are one example where the 
state has lost or at least struggles to retain its monopoly of force in an entire region of the 
country (Ojie/Ewhrudjakpor 2009). The resettlement of Nigeria’s capital city from Lagos to Abuja 
in 1991, with the intention to create a more effective, legitimate, and inclusive state apparatus 
in a central location for all Nigerians, is another example of how Nigeria has been and still 
struggles to achieve consolidated statehood (Falola/Heaton 2008). Based on these examples and 
despite obstacles to capturing statehood sub-nationally, it is necessary to continue consistent 
data collection and analysis efforts – not only because there is a scientific and practical need 
to generate the best data possible, while simultaneously acknowledging its shortcomings, but 
also because it is important to be able to underline and point out such flaws in the data and 
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thus to strive for improvements. Next, the data and methods applied for this contribution will 
be introduced, followed by an illustration of examples of possible applications and analysis of 
the data. Lastly, the advantages of the presented approach and the challenges that remain will 
be discussed. 
2.1 Methods and Data Sources
To measure the degree of statehood of the 36 Nigerian federal states and the Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT), data has been taken from two sources: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010) to capture the monopoly of force and the National Bureau 
of Statistics Nigeria (NBS) (Federal Republic of Nigeria NBS 2012) to assess the administrative 
capacity of the individual federal states. 
While ACLED codes a wide range of events of political violence 3, including their location, 
time, the interacting parties involved4, and the type of event5, only indicators that take 
violent conflicts into account, which threaten the state’s monopoly of force directly, were 
considered. While Linke-Behren’s contribution to this working paper also uses ACLED data, 
the measurement presented here is a stricter measurement of infringement of the monopoly 
of force. It is stricter, since it includes only battle types that challenge the state’s monopoly 
of force directly but excludes events of political violence that only potentially challenge 
the monopoly of force, as well as where ACLED information is deemed too vague to clearly 
categorize these events as an infringement of the state’s monopoly of force. Examples for data 
too vague for evaluation include protests where it is not clear whether such protests challenge 
the state’s monopoly of force. Also not included is the establishment of a headquarter by a non-
state group, where it is equally unclear whether this has any effect on the state’s monopoly of 
force. While this approach allows for a clear point of determination as to which occurrences of 
violence should be included, it may not be suitable for all country contexts, where such acts of 
violence have, for example, not been recorded but where limitations of the monopoly of force 
still exist. For such cases, other selection criteria may have to be developed (see Linke-Behrens, 
in this paper). Thus, the monopoly of force is assessed through a negative proxy. In detail, 
three battle types have been included: 1. battle-non-state actor overtakes territory, 2. battle-no 
change of territory, and 3. battle-government regains territory. While the first two battle types 
are immediately plausible, since they capture conflicts where a non-state actor overtakes or tries 
to overtake territory from the state, the third battle type where the government regains territory 
3 A politically violent event is defined as “a single altercation where often force is used by one or more 
groups for a political end” (with some exceptions; Raleigh/Dowd 2016: 7).
4 In order to qualify as an actor, an organization must have an official name (with the exception of 
protesters/rioters) and a political purpose, i.e. direct their actions at political authority, and must use 
violence or protest for political means. Organizations must be cohesive, and their events must be 
connected with their political purpose. These actors include: governments, rebel groups, political 
militias, identity militias, protesters/rioters/civilians, and a category for “unidentified armed groups”. 
For definitions, see Raleigh/Dowd 2016.
5  The event types include: battles (no change of territory; non-state actor overtakes territory; government 
regains territory), headquarter or base established, strategic development, riots/protests, violence 
against civilians, non-violent transfer of territory, and remote violence. For definitions, see Raleigh/
Dowd 2016.
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requires some explanation. While the outcome of such a battle might signal consolidation of 
the state’s monopoly of force when projected into the future, it has still been included as a 
challenge to the state’s monopoly of force, since at the time of battle and prior to the battle, this 
territory either no longer belonged to the state or was at least in dispute. All three battle types 
have been considered and combined into one indicator measuring the monopoly of force as 
a negative proxy. To increase robustness, a mean value accounting for the last three years has 
been calculated for each year. A higher number of conflicts per year therefore signals a lower 
monopoly of force.
Effective administrative capacity as the second statehood component has been calculated 
using data from the Nigerian NBS, observing the number of vehicles stolen, the number of 
vehicles recovered, and the number of vehicles not recovered by the given federal state. The 
indicator was created by calculating the ratio of vehicles stolen to vehicles recovered by federal 
state. Again, to increase robustness, a mean value accounting for the last three years has 
been calculated, per year. This indicator is thought to reflect the administrative capacity of 
the federal states, since it not only shows their ability to record stolen vehicles but also those 
recovered, while keeping records of both. Thus, a higher ratio of vehicles recovered to vehicles 
stolen signals greater administrative capacity, since it also shows that laws against theft were 
successfully implemented. 
The two single indicators for monopoly of force and administrative capacity have been 
combined into one equally weighted index to measure statehood by federal state. The index has 
been standardized to range from 0 to 1, with 0 signaling the lowest level of statehood and 1 the 
highest level possible. Consequently, values higher than 0.0 but lower than 0.9 indicate areas of 
limited statehood. The measurement is currently available for the years 2003 to 2009.
2.2 Application
The map of Nigeria displaying the level of statehood per federal state (see Figure 1) shows the 
wide variation of statehood one finds within Nigeria. 
While Edo state displays the highest level of statehood with a score of 0.83, Rivers shows 
the lowest level with 0.27. This is not only remarkable because it underlines the wide variation 
one finds within Nigeria with regards to statehood, but also because both states are located 
in southern Nigeria. Thus, even federal states in geographical proximity to one another may 
display very different levels of statehood. Besides those extreme values, two regions stand out: 
The Niger Delta region in the South as with the North of Nigeria exhibits many federal states 
with low levels of statehood. Both regions have been particularly plagued by long-lasting, violent 
conflicts. The Niger Delta has been affected by conflicts often connected to oil, other natural 
resources, and the control over these resources. The North has been affected by conflicts related 
to violent groups, such as Boko Haram (see Kingsley 2013). Besides the geographical variation, 
one also finds varying levels of statehood across time. For example, while the FCT’s level of 
statehood was at 0.48 in 2003, it increased to 0.65 in 2009. In the same time period, Bauchi’s level 
of statehood fell from 0.69 to 0.56.
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Figure 1: Statehood mapping by federal state in Nigeria, 2009. 
Source: Author’s illustration based on own calculation using ACLED and NBS data.
Figure 2 reveals additional insight regarding statehood patterns, as it provides more detailed 
information on the distribution of statehood values among the federal states and allows for a 
more fine-grained analysis than Figure 1. No state in Nigeria reaches a score of 0.9 or higher (i.e. 
consolidated statehood), and in no federal state is the state completely absent (i.e. with a score of 
0.0). In fact, most of the federal states range between 0.5 and 0.7 with regard to their respective 
levels of statehood. This further underlines the observation that only few federal states could 
be described as areas of extremely limited statehood, but that an equally low number of states 
reach high statehood values and come close to what could be considered a consolidated federal 
state. While limited statehood is pervasive in Nigeria, the degrees of statehood limitation vary 
immensely. Another interesting finding is the FCT score. Even though the FCT contains Abuja 
as the national capital and could therefore be expected to display a particularly high level of 
statehood, it in fact displays a mid-range level of statehood with a score of 0.65. Numerous other 
states show significantly higher levels of statehood.
Beyond these first applications, the data can potentially also be used for a wide range of 
other analyses. One example would be the inclusion of different degrees of statehood as a sub-
national explanatory factor in complex regression analyses, such as multilevel modeling, in 
order to consider statehood’s effect on state legitimacy or governance effectiveness (see e.g. Hox 
2010 on multilevel modeling). In sum, Figure 1 and 2 defy any notion of statehood as being 
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generally on a low or high level within Nigeria. The country is neither monolithic nor constant 
over time, regarding its level of statehood. Sub-national variations of statehood exist within 
Nigeria and ought to be taken into account.
Figure 2: Statehood by federal state in Nigeria, 2009. 
Source: Author’s illustration based on own statehood calculation with ACLED and NBS data.
2.3 Advantages and Challenges
The presented measure of statehood offers many advantages and potential for further research 
beyond its application to Nigeria. First, it helps to open up the black box of the national level 
of analysis and allows for examination below the national level, when analyzing statehood. It 
therefore creates a perspective that has often been overlooked or was previously hard to access. 
Second, the possible applications and use of such data are broad. The presented applications are 
only first suggestions and could, for example, be expanded to dynamic mappings of statehood 
over time. Third, the clear analytical definition of statehood and the indicators used could 
be applied to other country contexts. While the used ACLED data is available for numerous 
other countries, data from other national statistical offices would have to be gathered. However, 
capturing administrative capacity through data similar to the data used here is, in principal, 
also a possibility for other contexts (see Linke-Behrens in this paper for another measurement 
of administrative capacity). 
Despite the insight and advantages this approach offers, several challenges remain. First, the 
quality and availability of data from areas of limited statehood may be problematic (Jerven 2009). 
For the data presented here, this mainly applies to the data of the NBS or data on administrative 
capacity, in general. While this is a valid point of criticism, there are ways to increase the 
reliability of the data at hand. The approach suggested here is to calculate the mean over time 
to increase robustness. Additionally, the data presented underwent qualitative reliability checks 
Measuring Statehood on a Sub-National Level: A Dialogue among Methods  |  14
through field research in Nigeria, and the results and mappings were discussed with Nigerian 
scholars and other experts on the topic. Through both field research and external review, the 
data generated was widely perceived to give a largely adequate picture of sub-national statehood 
patterns in Nigeria. Second, while breaking up national borders and looking below the state 
level is a highly relevant perspective, analyzing federal states shifts the problem to the next 
level, since federal states are also bound by their territorial borders (see also Linke-Behrens in 
this paper). Thus, even further disaggregation of levels of statehood on the sub-national and 
cross-national level is a desirable effort, achievable, for example, through more fine-grained 
quantitative data, qualitative approaches (see Glawion in this paper), or the use of satellite-
image-driven methods (see Pech in this paper). 
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3. Combined Qualitative and Quantitative Data at the Sub-National Level
By Luisa Linke-Behrens
If statehood is defined as the monopoly of force and administrative capacity (see introduction), 
we can assume that these two components can arise in different configurations – a stronger or 
weaker monopoly of force may be paired with either stronger or weaker administrative capacity. 
States which hold the monopoly of force do not necessarily have the resources in terms of 
staff, money or infrastructure – to implement rules. Take China for example – a country whose 
government experiences great difficulty in implementing certain bodies of legislation, e.g. as 
concerns the environment, even though the government does not possess the monopoly of 
force. While it is difficult to imagine how a state could exhibit administrative capacity without 
possessing the monopoly of force, I contend that it is an empirical question whether higher 
administrative capacity can be paired with a lower monopoly of force. My research examines 
these variations. 
One can certainly find different configurations of statehood when comparing countries by 
means of national data. Yet I believe, as do the co-authors of this working paper, that the analysis 
of the variation of statehood at the sub-national level promises more refined results. I therefore 
adopt a meso-level approach, using quantitative data from the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Data Project (ACLED), which Stollenwerk introduced in the previous section, as well as 
data on the size of the public administration from the National Statistics Bureau Tanzania. I 
illustrate this measurement with examples from my research in mainland Tanzania. The next 
paragraphs explain the methods of data collection and analysis in more detail and illustrate these 
methods with examples from research on mainland Tanzania. I conclude with an assessment of 
the advantages and challenges which this approach entails.
3.1 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis
First and foremost, the monopoly of force is operationalized as the control over the means 
of violence on state territory and is measured with the ACLED dataset, which codes events of 
political violence. In this context, political violence is defined as a single event where force is used 
by an actor with a political purpose or motivation (with some exceptions; Raleigh/Dowd 2016: 7). 
In contrast to Stollenwerk’s conservative measurement, I employ a broader operationalization 
of the monopoly of force, which includes categories beyond battles (cf. footnote 5). This choice 
was deliberately made with the case of Tanzania in mind, where no battles took place in recent 
years; but to say that the government’s monopoly of force is uncontested seems imprecise. 
The activities of the Al-Shabaab militia in the North of the country certainly interfere with the 
monopoly of force; heavily violent poachers and bomb attacks are equally clear in contesting 
the government’s rule, and milder forms of contestation, such as large-scale riots, lead to 
temporary loss of control by government authorities. I suggest that the mere inclusion of these 
types of events allows for a nuanced and adequate picture, not only in Tanzania but beyond 
this case as well (cf. Glawion, this paper). Most of the coded event types in the dataset challenge 
the monopoly of force, though not all. I exclude protests because they usually do not pose a 
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threat to the state’s monopoly of force. Events of violence against civilians are excluded, if the 
aggressor is a representative of the state itself, such as “police use tear gas to disperse Chadema 
supporters gathered for a peaceful political rally” (event 459TAZ; Raleigh et al. 2010). Strategic 
developments are included only if the initiating party is not the state itself. For example, police 
increasing security in Zanzibar after a grenade attack does not qualify as a challenge to the 
monopoly of  force (event 457TAZ; Raleigh et al. 2010), although the actual attack does qualify 
(event 456TAZ; Raleigh et al. 2010). 
Second, the operationalization of administrative capacity is a vexing challenge because many 
options rely on a measurement of some sort of governance (e.g. Rotberg 2004, 2013), or the data 
collection is highly difficult, as will be mentioned subsequently. To use a proxy for the regulatory 
aspect of law making and enforcement, I rely on the number of public officials in ratio to 
population size (National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania 2014). As Soifer (2008) has pointed out, 
measuring capacity or capability via resources available to the state, such as the number of 
police officers, soldiers, or tax collectors, or its financial resources, is one of the most widely 
used approaches. Furthermore, interviews with international actors6 hint at the importance of 
this indicator: the number of available staff was named one of the most important issues for 
developing guidelines, negotiating projects, and implementing national policy at the local level. 
While skill levels, political willingness, and financial resources are oftentimes an issue as well, 
the decisive factor seems to be the size of the administration. Besides, the measurement of skill 
level and political willingness is hardly possible beyond a micro-study. 
3.2 Application
After aggregating the ACLED data events in mainland Tanzania from 20137 at the sub-national 
level, we see that the monopoly of force encounters the most challenges in the Arusha region, 
with ten events of political violence (see Figure 3). These events include several instances of 
violent extrajudicial justice by vigilante militias, two bomb attacks by an Islamist militia, and 
politically motivated riots clashing with the police. Eight events occurred in the Dar es Salaam 
region, five regions did not witness any kind of event (Katawi, Morogoro, Ruvuma, Shinyanga, 
and Singida regions), while one to five events occurred in all other regions. The severity of 
these events differs largely, ranging from the spontaneous eruption of riots with no fatalities 
to a nine-day long dismantlement of an Al-Shabaab training camp by the police, involving 
fighting and the rescue of almost 90 captives. By a measure of event numbers, the monopoly 
of force is relatively stable across the country, with the slight exception of Arusha, especially 
when compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, Sudan witnessed almost 
1,000 events in 2013 with around 7,000 fatalities, although 2013 was admittedly an extreme year 
(Daoust 2015; Raleigh et al. 2010). 
6 Interviews with international organizations and donors in the field of public health were conducted in 
the course of a research stay in South Africa and Tanzania from January to March 2016.
7 2013 is the most recent year for which data on public officials in Tanzania are available; to ensure 
internal consistency of the indicator, all other data are also from 2013. All data are for mainland 
Tanzania, excluding Zanzibar. Please note that the results are preliminary.
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Figure 3: Events of political violence in Tanzania, per region, 2013. 
Source: Author’s own illustration based on ACLED.
In Mainland Tanzania, the distribution of public officials is extremely uneven when measured 
against the size of population (see Figure 4). In Katavi region, we find the most unfavorable ratio, 
with one public official per 303 inhabitants, while in Geita region, there is one public official per 
31 inhabitants. In seven regions, the ratio lies between 1:102 and 1:165, and in the remaining 16 
regions, it lies between 1:33 to 1:87. Given these strikingly large discrepancies, the assumption 
that the size of public service effectively translates into differing levels of assertiveness of rule 
seems justified. With such an unfavorable ratio of public officials to inhabitants as can be seen 
in the Katavi region, lawmaking and enforcement would need to be much more effectively 
organized than in the Geita region, in order to attain the same level of administrative capacity. 
This is highly unlikely, and the conclusion itself suggests that the level of administrative 
capacity of the Tanzanian authorities varies immensely between these two regions, as well as 
throughout the country.
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Figure 4: Number of public officials to population in Tanzania, per region, 2013. 
Source: Author’s own illustration based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics in 
Tanzania (2013, 2014).
When putting together the components of statehood, we see some interesting variation. There 
are cases where both components of statehood are at high levels. Morogoro region, for example, 
has one of the best ratios of public officials to inhabitants (1:33) and has not witnessed any event of 
political violence. Some other regions also follow this pattern. Then, there are two regions with 
relatively high law enforcement ability, albeit with some challenges to the monopoly of force. In 
the Arusha and Dar es Salaam regions, where most events of political violence occurred in 2013, 
the ratio of public officials to inhabitants is quite favorable (1:70 and 1:52, respectively). On the 
other hand, in the region with the most unfavorable ratio of public officials to inhabitants, not 
a single event of political violence has occurred (Katavi region). Finally, there are a few regions 
with a relatively unfavorable ratio of public officials to inhabitants with some events of political 
violence, such as the Rukwa region (1:108; three events) and Mtwara region (1:113; five events). 
What we see is that the level of statehood varies within Tanzania to quite an extent, and that the 
components of statehood can indeed come together to form different configurations. 
3.3 Advantages and Challenges
Overall, I believe this approach is capable of delivering a fairly adequate picture of statehood and 
its variation throughout a state’s territory, which circumvents national aggregation. However, 
the proxies and data sources pose a few challenges, which I will review here. First, the ACLED 
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data are collected from reports of (local) media or political actors and are thus biased toward 
areas that are in the interest of the public. On the upside, these data are very comprehensive and 
allow for analysis even at the village level. The soft operationalization that I have employed can 
be accused of blurring the dividing line between the monopoly of force and security governance; 
however, this approach does capture smaller, non-battle events that contest the monopoly of 
force – events which I consider to be equally important.
The most serious problem with the second indicator, i.e. the size of the public administration, 
is that similar ratios of public officials to inhabitants may not translate into similar levels of 
administrative capacity, since public officials may not be willing to act, possibly because of 
adverse incentives. They may also lack the necessary skills or the financial resources to carry 
out their tasks. This problem is especially aggravated in political systems where “everything 
is negotiable”. Large-scale, political corruption and everyday bribery seriously undermine the 
function of public service and may distort the validity of this indicator. Yet, staff is a highly 
important resource for the state in making and enforcing law and is one on which the proper 
functioning of the administration critically hinges. While by no means perfect, this indicator 
does make a very good impression on the administrative capacity of the state. 
Turning to a more general discussion of such a meso-level approach, the most difficult 
challenge is arguably the substitution of one level of aggregation with another. While I criticize 
country-level analyses for overlooking important inner-country differences of statehood, the 
level of statehood may vary also within a given region. In other words, this approach is guilty 
of methodological sub-nationalism. However, I submit that it constitutes a viable compromise 
between country-level data – assuming uniformity throughout a state’s territory, and thus 
potentially oversimplifying – and micro-level analyses at the very local level, with their problems 
of generalizability and data collection (see Glawion, this paper, for a different view). Settling on 
the meso-level is a way of avoiding the important pitfalls of both. This approach allows us to 
zoom in and assess statehood at the sub-national level. It also makes possible comparisons 
between levels and configurations of statehood within one country and even across countries.
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4. International Organizations’ Perceptions of Statehood on a Sub-National Level: 
A Qualitative Approach
By Angela Heucher and Leon Schettler 
How can we assess statehood on a sub-national level by drawing on perceptions of actors external 
to the state? Our contribution provides an answer to this question. For our research project 
“‘Talk, and Action’: How International Organizations React to Areas of Limited Statehood”, we 
collect and analyze data on the perceptions of international organizations (IOs)8 concerning 
the state’s monopoly of force, as well as on its administrative capacity in different areas. IOs 
are important external governance actors providing a range of fundamental public goods (e.g. 
food, education, water, or shelter). Their presence on the ground, combined with their global 
perspective, make them excellent sources of information on degrees of statehood. Working 
with state actors on all levels in their daily operations on the one hand, and yet standing outside 
the state system of a given country on the other, allows them to adopt the perspective of an 
“involved outsider”. In order to gain access to these stocks of knowledge and their perceptions, 
we conducted interviews with four international and three regional organizations9 in their 
respective headquarters, as well as in five countries.10 To analyze these interviews together with 
IO documents, we have employed a qualitative content analysis. Below, we will first elaborate on 
our methods of data collection and data analysis. We will then provide some examples for that 
which our approach allows us to see, drawing on our own research. Finally, we will reflect upon 
the advantages and challenges of our approach for measuring statehood on a sub-national level.
4.1 Methods and Data Sources
Our research project builds on two main data sources: documents published by the organizations 
themselves, such as annual reports, country strategies, or project reports and evaluations and 
interviews conducted with staff of IOs11 (for further insights on interviews, cf. Glawion, this 
8 In the following, we use international organizations in reference to both international and regional 
organizations.
9 We identified seven different organizations of interest for our research project (in alphabetical order): 
ECHO (Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection of the European Commission); 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations); IDB (Inter-American Development 
Bank); IICA (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture); NEPAD (New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development); WB (World Bank) and the WFP (World Food Programme). Our case selection 
thus covers: a) organizations focused on different types of activities (emergency relief, as well as more 
long-term development, e.g. in agriculture); b) different types of organizations (development banks, 
UN-specialized organizations and UN-programs); and c) different memberships (global as well as 
regional).
10 We chose five different countries in which we conducted interviews with the staff of international 
organizations in country offices: Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Niger, and Sierra Leone. This country 
selection was based on varying degrees of statehood on the national level building on indicators such 
as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
11 Interviews with international organizations were conducted in the course of research stays in 
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Niger, and Sierra Leone from January to March 2016. Interviews at IO 
headquarters (Brussels, Johannesburg, Rome, San José, and Washington) were conducted in May, June, 
and September 2015.
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paper). Combining such different sources allowed us to crosscheck and verify the information we 
gathered where and when necessary. We gathered our interview material at the IOs’ headquarters 
and at select country offices. We used different sources to identify interview partners, including 
official websites, social media (e.g. LinkedIn), project documents, and “snowballing” among 
colleagues (cp. Goldstein 2002; Welch et al. 1999). We derived structured questions on statehood 
and governance from the conceptualizations developed at the Collaborative Research Center 
700 (see introduction; Draude et al. 2012). These questions provided the basic infrastructure 
for our interview guidelines, as well as of the coding scheme we built to analyze our material 
(see below). To leave space for the experiences and points of view of individual interviewees, we 
combined these questions with open questions in a semi-structured interview guideline (cp. 
Aberbach/Rockman 2002; Bryman 2012; Gläser/Laudel 2004; Leech 2002; Pfadenhauer 2005). To 
cover perceptions on statehood among IO staff, we asked: To what extent do you observe limitations 
of the state to control the territory? To what extent do you observe limitations of the state to design and 
implement rules? To account for sub-national variation, we included the question: Do you observe 
any regional variation? How do different degrees of statehood affect your work?
Regarding the collection of organizational documents, we specified the timeframe and the 
types of documents. In addition, a guideline detailed how the process of collecting documents 
was to be conducted, gave examples for types of documents, and established rules on how to 
proceed, where the attribution of documents to a certain document category was unclear. We 
discussed, tested, and revised the guideline for document research along with the interview 
questions to enhance their quality and to ensure an unequivocal application. 
We analyzed the data by means of qualitative content analysis (cp. e.g. Früh 2011; Mayring 
2008, 2010; Schreier 2012, 2014). To build a coding frame for the analysis, we combined concept-
driven and data-driven strategies – such a combined strategy being the strategy most commonly 
applied in qualitative content analysis (Schreier 2012). We derived codes deductively from 
our definition of statehood, and we developed codes inductively by taking a sub-sample of 
the overall material (approximately ten percent), adding codes accordingly to cover additional 
relevant dimensions mentioned by interviewees and in documents. For example, we included 
a code on “restricted access”, as many interview partners described the challenge of gaining 
access to territories controlled by non-state, armed groups. While this may be linked to a limited 
monopoly on the use of force, it may also be the government that restricts access. Hence, we 
needed a separate code. To increase inter-coder reliability (Schreier 2012), we coded the same 
material individually and then compared the results, then wrote memos for each code and 
deleted those of minor relevance for the project – a time-consuming but crucial process. 
4.2 Application
What does this particular method of data collection and analysis allow us to see with regard 
to statehood on a sub-national level? We illustrate this point with examples from Colombia. 
Regarding the monopoly of force, IOs observe that the government does not have full control 
of several regions, particularly along the Pacific Coast and along the borders with Venezuela and 
Ecuador. While IOs recognize that statehood is limited to different degrees on a sub-national 
level, this does not necessarily mean that they cannot work in these areas. For instance, one 
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IO-official reported that restrictions in terms of security and access are the source of the most 
severe limitations. However, where a minimum understanding between the IO and an armed 
non-state actor exists, the IO in question can go in and provide humanitarian assistance and 
development. A monopoly of force is thus not necessarily required for the IO to become active. 
Nonetheless, IOs act on behalf of the respective state, and the linkages between IOs and the 
government can still be close: Even though IOs work in certain areas of Colombia on their own, 
they seek approval and coordinate with government bodies on a strategic level. 
Regarding the second dimension of statehood – the capacity to implement and enforce 
rules – there even exist “two Colombias”, according to one interviewee: one of them “with very 
sophisticated rules and legal frameworks”, the other one exhibiting “[an] absence of [the] state”. 
In the latter Colombia, these “very sophisticated rules” are not enforced. For instance, indigenous 
communities may have obtained formal titles and rights to land but cannot actually return to 
the land, due to illegal occupation by armed groups. While the Colombian government thus has 
the capacity to draft rules and regulations, its administrative capacity is nonetheless limited, as 
it cannot enforce rules on land rights in certain parts of the country.
IOs are very aware of the varying capacities they encounter in different regions of a country. 
For instance, in addition to the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment” (CPIA), which 
assesses the institutional capacity of a state on the national level, World Bank staff in country 
offices also conduct more informal and qualitative assessments, which take varying state 
capacities in different regions, municipalities, and communities into account. In fact, regional 
and local capacities to coordinate different actors and to control corruption are evaluated on 
a permanent basis by World Bank staff, even in the framework of projects that are explicitly 
national by design. Because IOs generally understand well that de jure responsibilities (e.g. the 
state is responsible) are not necessarily equivalent to de facto responsibilities (e.g. who is actually 
in charge) in a given context, they conduct formal and, most often, informal assessments on the 
sub-national level. Perceptions resulting from these assessments then inform IO behavior, as 
they allow the IO to work through de facto authorities on the sub-national and local levels (e.g. 
local chiefs). 
In sum, limitations of the monopoly of force as the first dimension of statehood on a sub-
national level are not an issue, per se, for IOs working primarily on humanitarian aid, as a 
minimum level of security and access enable their operations. At the same time, IOs do have 
minimal requirements vis-à-vis the state, even in humanitarian settings. At the very least, 
they need the state’s consent to work in the country. IOs working in the field of long-term 
development, on the other hand, view limitations of a state’s administrative capacity – the 
second dimension of statehood – in a given area as more worrisome. In their work, IOs have to 
consider carefully where and how they can work with which state actor, even if capacities are 
limited, so as to not endanger long-term objectives – for example, that the government should 
take over responsibilities from IOs in the long run.
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4.3 Advantages, Limitations, Challenges (and How to Deal with Them)
We are convinced that our methodological approach offers valuable insights concerning 
degrees of statehood on a sub-national level, which could not be observed otherwise. The largely 
qualitative data collection and analysis enables us to assess how the monopoly of force, as well 
as administrative capacity, are judged by IOs who work in contexts of limited statehood on a 
daily basis, both at the national and at the sub-national level. Arguably, this assessment of IO 
staff has advantages over assessments by alternative experts: IO staff provides valuable sources 
of knowledge, because they work directly with state actors (unlike experts based in research 
institutes), without being part of the state structure (unlike public officials). The former aspect 
allows them to assess practical deficits (e.g. the gap between the design and implementation 
of a reform, despite sufficient resources on paper). The latter aspect usually implies distance 
from the state institutions in question, forming a comparative perspective assessing countries 
and a global network of analytical support. Of course, some of these advantages also hold 
for a number of other actors who are part of the “governance-constellation” within a given 
country. Our approach could thus be applied relatively straightforwardly to other governance 
actors, such as bilateral development agencies, international or national non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), foundations, public-private-partnerships (PPPs), and so on. Furthermore, 
in comparison to close-ended questionnaires or surveys, our approach – semi-structured 
interviews as a method for data collection – allows us to explore more in depth the weight and 
role of perceptions of statehood on a sub-national level, as compared to other factors that shape 
the governance activities of IOs.
However, our approach comes with certain limitations. To begin with, we focus on 
organizational perspectives and thus on “subjective” points of view rather than “objective” 
indicators. These perspectives need not necessarily relate closely to the “actual situation on the 
ground”, whichever way this can be identified. As we strive to assess the perspective of an IO 
in a given context, we are obliged to show that our interviews are, in fact, fairly representative 
of the IO as a whole. As with all studies reliant on interviews, our access to interviewees was 
partly based on personal contacts and subsequent snowballing, which raises the question 
of generalizability. Nonetheless, we controlled for this source of bias by choosing interview 
partners as systematically as possible, by leading several interviews in each organization, and by 
cross-checking our interview results with the analysis of organizational documents. 
Further limitations concerning our approach are equally typical for studies based on 
interviews (Anfaran 2002; Bryman 2012). For example, we are two researchers with two distinct 
personalities – a factor that may influence how questions are asked and at what point during 
an interview we delve deeper. We dealt with this challenge by conducting interviews together 
during our first round of interviews at IO headquarters and during our second round of 
interviews at IO country offices. However, the possibility to conduct interviews together and 
to evaluate the obtained results between research trips in our team created opportunities 
for in-depth reflection, which are rarely available to researchers working on their own. Next, 
we sought to record our interviews wherever possible. Interviews that could not be recorded 
entered the analysis in the form of notes taken during the interview. Nuances in formulations 
are extremely difficult to derive from these notes. The problem of validity is mitigated where 
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we conducted the interview together and were hence able to compare and complete our notes 
directly afterwards. Despite these challenges, we see our approach overall as a promising one 
to appear on this Working Paper’s “menu of possibilities” for measuring statehood on a sub-
national level. 
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5. Development of an Urban Area of Limited Statehood Observed from Above: The Case of 
Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo
By Lisa Pech
Statehood can vary immensely – ranging from consolidated statehood on the one end to 
extremely limited statehood, often combined with civil conflict, on the other. Along this 
continuum, research in areas of civil conflict poses particularly daunting problems: field 
research is often not possible or is possible only in a very limited way because of insecurity 
and difficulties in accessibility. Furthermore, time-series data is needed, if development during 
protracted conflict and the impact of protracted conflict shall be measured over time. Therefore, 
alternatives to measuring statehood in regions of extremely limited statehood and a volatile 
security situation are needed.
In my contribution, I will thus address this gap and demonstrate how state decline and 
conflict can be analyzed and documented “from above”, using satellite imagery. Remote-sensing-
based land use assessments are combined with expert and field12 knowledge to support detailed 
and spatially explicit mappings of land use development in conflict areas.
Empirically, this contribution examines changes in urban land use in the eastern part of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with a focus on Goma, the capital of North Kivu 
province. The observation period from 1986 to 2015, depicted in Figure 5, covers the effects of 
the Rwandan civil war (1990–1994) and its aftermath, as well as the escalation of violence in the 
DRC, including the three Congo Wars, starting in 1996 and officially ending in 2009.
The time periods between 1986 and 1999 (Figure 6) and 2002 and 2006 (Figure 7) will be 
described in more detail, showing examples of the satellite imagery used.
5.1 Data and Methodology
High-resolution (HR) satellite imagery from the Landsat program, which is downloadable from 
the US Geological Survey (USGS) Earth-Explorer, was used for this study (US Geological Survey 
2015). This joint NASA/USGS program provides the longest continuous space-based record of 
the earth’s surface (since 1972). Landsat sensors have a moderate spatial resolution that ranges 
between 15 and 60m, which is an appropriate resolution for broad coverage yet still detailed 
enough to analyze human-scale processes, such as urban development (NASA 2015). The Landsat 
system is designed to collect up to ten bands or channels of reflected energy. These bands 
are used to discriminate between earth surface materials through the development of spectral 
signatures (Chuvieco Salinero 1996). For any material, the amount of reflected radiation varies 
by wavelength. There are many possible combinations of spectral bands depending on the 
feature one wants to detect and illustrate (Chuvieco Salinero 2002). To better distinguish urban 
from non-urban land use during visual interpretation, I depict each dataset using two different 
band combinations: natural color and a false color combination, comprising the shortwave 
infrared (on the red cannon), near infrared (on the green cannon), and red band (on the blue 
12 I conducted interviews with the local population, international and local organizations active in the 
fields of urban planning, humanitarian aid, and security during research trips to Kinshasa and Goma 
between January and September 2016.
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cannon). In this combination, vigorously vegetated areas are depicted in light green tones; less 
vigorous vegetation in brownish green or light brown tones; clear water in black; built-up areas 
in purple to brown; and bare soil in grey, brown, and black tones, which makes it sometimes 
difficult to distinguish soil from built-up areas on the basis of tonality (Chuvieco Salinero 2002). 
These difficulties make contextual knowledge and features other than tonality crucial to visual 
interpretation, such as:
• Texture: is the arrangement and frequency of tonal variation in particular areas of an 
image. Rough textures consist of a sprinkled tone, where the tonal levels change abruptly, 
whereas smooth textures would have very little tonal variation. Smooth textures are 
the result of even surfaces, such as fields, asphalt, grasslands, or water (without waves); 
examples for rough surfaces are forest canopies and turbulent water.
• Shadow: is also helpful in interpretation. It may provide an idea of the profile and relative 
height of an object.
• Association: takes into account the relationship between other recognizable features. 
I realized image interpretation visually, by considering gross distribution of objects and 
apportionment of the area. For recognition of regional particularities and details, areas are 
considered individually and objects are recognized and compared to aerial imagery and very 
high-resolution (VHR) satellite imagery (Google Earth), a limited choice of topographic maps, 
field comparison, and expert interviews, in order to verify uncertain interpretation results. The 
visual interpretation and the digitization of urban areas were carried out manually in ArcGIS 
10.1. The last step is constituted by the adequate depiction of the results through thematic 
mapping, carried out in QGIS.
5.2 Application/Results
Goma covered an area of 7 km² in 1986, increasing to 8 km² in 1989, with a temporal peak 
of 21.3 km² in 1995, including refugee camps after the Rwandan civil war. At present, Goma 
covers an area of 57 km². Armed conflicts in the Great Lakes region strongly influenced Goma’s 
development. Two different types of urban development were identified: a continuous westward 
directional growth of built-up area and fragmented development through the appearance and 
disappearance of settlements on Goma’s outskirts. 
The insecurity in Goma’s rural environs constitutes an important push factor for rural-urban 
migration. Relative security and economic prosperity in Goma constitute pull factors. Linked 
to the security situation, a large number of international humanitarian and peacekeeping 
personnel and an increasing number of national military personnel contribute to Goma’s 
population. The emergence of immense refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, 
including their closure and reopening, causes intermittent and fragmented development in 
Goma’s outskirts, intensified by a volcanic eruption in 2002. The following timeline (Figure 5) 
briefly depicts Goma’s spatial development from 1986 to 2015 and the sequence of events that 
has had an important impact on this development, followed by two more detailed examples, 
depicting satellite imagery in section 5.2.1. and 5.2.2.
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Figure 5: Goma – Urban land change and influential events 1986–2015.
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5.2.1 Goma and the Congolese Monopoly on the Use of Force
Since the beginning of armed conflict in the African Great Lakes region, certain impacts of 
civil war on the development of the city of Goma are clearly visible, such as like the expansion 
of built-up area and a change to the townscape through the construction of immense refugee 
camps. Other impacts, like war related economies in the outskirts of Goma that lead to economic 
growth and hence constructions of new neighborhoods, are also visible.
The regime shift after the end of the Rwandan civil war and genocide in 1994 triggered an 
influx of 800,000 Rwandan refugees into Goma and its surroundings (Deibert 2013, Johnson et 
al. 2016). In addition, the new population around Goma included 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers of 
the former Armed Forces of Rwanda, as well as almost all of the politicians of the former Hutu 
regime (Prunier 2008). The effects of this displacement, like the increase in Goma’s built-up 
area in general and the emergence of substantial refugee camps, are detectable on the satellite 
imagery in the upper segment of Figure 6.
The extent of built-up area in Goma increased from 14 km² in 1989 to 19 km² in 1995, 
comparing images from the respective years (see the middle of Figure 6): Built-up areas exhibit 
a rather rectangular character and a mixture of grayish/brownish/purple tones, and non-urban 
land use/vegetated areas appear in light green tones. Several refugee camps have sprouted up 
around Goma. On the left side of the image, Mugunga camp, housing about 800,000 refugees 
at peak times (Prunier 2008), measured roughly 2.5 km. Despite the relative coarse resolution of 
the imagery, the size of this campsite permits the recognition of infrastructural patterns, such 
as paths and parcels. The recognition of the campsite near the lakeshore, which housed the 
former Rwandan military covering about 100 m², required several expert interviews to identify 
its exact location.
The presence of the large Rwandan, Hutu-dominated and partly militarized refugee camps 
led the new Rwandan leadership to invade Congolese territory in the second half of 1996, 
marking the beginning of the First Congo War (1996/97). The retreating Congolese army during 
this invasion (Prunier 2008) serves as an example for the deficiency of the Congolese military 
at the time (Büscher 2011). On November 13th, Mugunga and other camps were forcibly closed 
by Rwandese mortar and infantry attacks, leading to the dispersal of up to one million refugees 
(Prunier 2008). According to interviewees present at the time, only days later, no trace of the 
camps remained. Unfortunately, the earliest imagery available (due to cloudy conditions) dates 
from 1999 (lower segment, Figure 6). Despite this dispersion, the urban area of Goma, measured 
on the imagery, expanded from 19 km² in 1995 to 25 km² in 1998/99.
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Figure 6: Goma 1986, 1995, 1999, the built-up area expands, and several camps, housing 
refugees from Rwanda, sprout up around the city (1995). By 1999, the camps have 
disappeared, and Goma’s built-up area has expanded further.
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5.2.2 The Congolese Government’s Capacity to Implement and Enforce Rules
With the first war transitioning almost seamlessly into the Second Congo War (1998–2003), on 
January 17th of 2002, an eruption of the nearby volcano Nyiragongo caused the destruction of a 
third of Goma’s buildings and left 14,800 families homeless (Kanene 2014). The lava flows that 
affected the city center are clearly visible on the image taken in 2002 (Figure 7). 
As both the invasion of the Rwandese army and the inaction of the Congolese army shed light 
on the ineptitude of the Congolese military, the consequences of the volcanic eruption indicate 
the failure of Congo’s central government and the RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) rebel 
government, in charge of Eastern Congo at that time (Johnson 2014), in different public sectors 
– namely, the capacity (or lack thereof ) to manage urban planning, (re)construction, and the 
organization of humanitarian measures. The absence of central planning in this urgency left 
the urban population to its own devices (Büscher 2011). According to an interviewee (Ngoboka 
Furaha, personal interview, 15.01.2016), the government did not arrange any measures concerning 
communication, evacuation, or humanitarian aid after the eruption, which lead to an influx of 
humanitarian aid workers comparable to that of the aftermath of the Rwandan civil war.
Spatial consequences of the eruption and the state’s incapacity to react are already visible 
in the image taken in 2003, Figure 7. The city began expanding westward, due to population 
displacement from the destructed city center. This initiated the genesis of two new districts on 
the outskirts of Goma: Mugunga, in place of the Rwandan refugee camp, and Lac Vert, South of 
Mugunga. 
Caused by the destruction of the city center, Goma continued to expand westward in a largely 
informal fashion. According to an interviewee, the city center was rebuilt at the same location, 
despite the hazardous position due to the lack of urban planning, visible in the image taken 
in 2006 (Figure 7) – with strips of lava almost completely covered by buildings. Furthermore, 
districts that were not affected directly became densely populated (Büscher/Vlassenroot 2010).
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Figure 7: The 2002 volcanic eruption destroyed a third of Goma’s buildings. In 2003, the 
lava is partly covered by buildings. In 2006, the density of built-up area has increased, and 
the city has expanded further westward.
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5.3 Advantages and Challenges of Earth Observation Data
The transformation of urban governance at the center of violent conflict over the last 25 years 
has turned the city of Goma into a fragmented urban space – politically, socioeconomically, and 
spatially. Earth observation data can show and quantify land use and its changes, shedding light 
on the spatial component of armed conflict, insecurity, and the absence of public institutions 
responsible for (urban) planning – above all by depicting processes that took place decades ago. 
Furthermore, this method is able to illustrate these processes in a way different from mere 
description through words. It also offers the possibility to “inspect” areas where the security 
situation temporarily does not allow field studies or where areas are simply too far away or too 
difficult to access, such as rural areas, woodlands, or mountainous regions. 
Thus, while the satellite imagery used for this study does actually document certain 
developments, it cannot explain the reasons for these changes all by itself. Ground-truthing 
and expert-interviews are essential to finding explanations for what was observed from above, 
though this becomes more difficult the further the analysis reaches back in time. But without 
this crucial step of investigation, the results from image analysis remain unreliable. To improve 
results and reliability, it would make sense to complement this work with other approaches, 
such as quantitative analysis (see Stollenwerk, this paper) and in-depth qualitative studies (see 
Glawion, this paper; Heucher, Schettler, this paper). 
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6. Field Research in Conflict Environments: Interviews, Focus Groups, and Observations in 
Somaliland and the Central African Republic 
By Tim Glawion
Qualitative field research on statehood necessitates a degree of flexibility, reminding us that 
abstractions are there to aid in understanding reality and not vice versa. This contribution will 
discuss the challenges of case selection and the gathering of qualitative data on statehood (cf. 
the definition of statehood in the introduction)13 on a sub-national level. A highly common 
simplification in the study of statehood is the usage of violent events as a proxy: if violence 
occurs, statehood is limited, when not, it is consolidated. This is misleading in most cases, as 
it neglects non-violent assertions of authority and non-violently-expressed contestations of a 
monopoly of force. It also furthers the common confluence of fragile statehood and civil war. 
Qualitative research can further our understanding by asking not what is absent, but rather 
which forces are present. Intriguing new forms of or alternatives to statehood can be the 
outcome of such an inquiry. I would go even further: statehood’s attributes of monopolization 
and legitimacy are subjective attributes at least as much as they are objectively observable 
through actions and capacities. In the following contribution, I first turn to the data gathering 
process, as collected through interviews, focus groups, and observations. I will then show how 
qualitative insights can be analyzed through comparison, across cases. Finally, I will illustrate 
these steps through two intriguing comparative results on statehood in Somaliland and the 
Central African Republic (CAR).14
6.1 Security Constraints for Case Selection, Data Gathering, and Analysis
The first step in conducting qualitative research is the selection of cases. Often, the absence of a 
monopoly of force is due to contestation by various groups, thereby creating security constraints 
for the researcher. Logistical issues – often linked to security threats, such as illegal road blocks 
– further reduce the number of possible research localities. Case selection confined by security 
and logistics impacts research design, such as avoiding cases with high levels of violence or latent 
instability risks. Key dynamics of limited statehood can thereby be overlooked that can even 
translate into positive bias and optimism toward non-state alternatives. Overcoming logistical 
constraints, i.e. by aerial route, is often facilitated by large non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), international organizations (IOs), or private companies accompanied by heavy outside 
influence, which again impacts statehood on the ground. To mitigate these effects, the researcher 
could distinguish her or himself through, for example, the following steps: staying at the local 
church or guest house, rather than at a UN or NGO compound; taking local transportation 
through town (if security permits), rather than continuously hitching rides in large SUVs; 
13 However, during qualitative research, the concept can and should be investigated with a great degree 
of flexibility.
14 The author expresses his gratitude to the Collaborative Research Centre 700 and the German Research 
Foundation (DFG/SFB700) for the means to conduct field research in the Central African Republic 
(February/March 2015, January to March 2016) and Somaliland (April to June 2015, April/May 2016).
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and, finally, by making the effort to clarify the research mission after every new encounter. To 
avoid being stuck with narratives presented by locals to international actors (in the hopes of 
impacting goods and project distribution), it can help to “latch on” to local experts, rather than 
internationals. I’ve hedged my bets with (former) university students and local journalists.
After case selection, data gathering within field sites of limited statehood faces further 
difficulties. With no monopoly of force in place – that is, in oligopolistic settings (Mehler et 
al. 2010) – research access must be negotiated with numerous actors. To gain access, it can 
help to climb the ladder from top to bottom. For example, if local policemen are the research 
subjects, a letter or stamp of approval from the Inspector General is key. If it is a local rebellion, 
their official leader is oftentimes also found in the capital. With these letters in hand, lower-
level individuals will feel freer to speak their mind.15 Nevertheless, some actors, such as armed 
contraband groups, can refuse an exchange, or state forces can deny access to opposition areas, 
making the gathered data necessarily biased toward certain actors and inhabitants. Surveys 
are thus rarely an option, as they would necessitate a wide and representative selection of 
participants (Kapiszewski et al. 2015). Gaining a local or national partner with access beyond 
the researcher’s reach, as well as having large budgets to spare, can nonetheless make the 
exceptional survey possible (Basedau/Köllner 2007). To gain wider perceptions on statehood, 
focus groups can enable some measure of approximation (Ryan et al. 2014): Participants can 
discuss and attempt to converge on who controls what means of violence and how, as well 
as on the degree to which rules can or cannot be enforced. Continuously asking for real-life 
examples can help guide such a theoretic discussion. It can be particularly interesting to have 
numerous focus groups discuss the same recent example of a key event – i.e. the arrest of an 
armed group leader – to gauge different interpretations of the event in question. However, 
in a situation without security guarantees, self-censorship in front of other participants can 
bias data. Individual interviews must thus complement group discussions (Rathbun 2008). 
In an interview setting, it becomes easier to provide a secure and private environment. While 
staying open to all events and issues raised by the interviewees is important, arriving well-
informed will open many doors. Demonstrating knowledge of key actors, names, and events 
when they are raised by interviewees can bring discussions to the next level, as the researcher 
will more likely be accepted as an insider. Media reports and early talks with well-informed 
locals can grant such prior access. In my research, I have hired a local person in each research 
locality to keep me informed during my absence, through monthly reports. The triangulation 
between these varying sources – interviews, focus groups, and third-party reports – can unveil 
individual biases. At the same time, these individual biases – e.g. on who started an attack and 
who emerged the victor – are themselves a source of information on statehood, as they describe 
the perceived capacities of certain actors and their legitimacy. Finally, it can help to observe the 
monopolization (or lack thereof ) of force, personally: Seeing and hearing discussions between 
actors in everyday life, listening in on mediation meetings, or sitting next to a roadblock can all 
grant the chance to cross-check that which has been said with that which has been done.
15 This, of course, does not lessen the researcher’s responsibility to treat the discussion with absolute 
confidentiality AAA (2012).
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Since case selection in areas of limited statehood requires ad hoc flexibility and since data 
generation methods are often limited and approximate, the analysis must make extra effort to 
get to the heart of what constitutes statehood. First, qualitative research should ask not what 
is absent but which institutions and forces are present. These forces and institutions could 
be beyond traditional European expectations – that is, official state forces, such as the police 
and army, and its institutions settled into concrete buildings. State forces themselves might 
form an oligopoly of competing poles, while non-state actors and institutions need equal 
appreciation. Certain questions that guide theory and field work can assist in grasping these 
complexities, such as the following: The international boundaries of the state are not the only 
possible containers of statehood – thus what other type of monopoly is or could be at play? Even 
in Western European states, multiple institutions and actors always co-exist. Thus, who are the 
actors involved and how must they relate and interact, in order to constitute a monopoly? What 
forms of order exist that have more than one power pole? As the answers to these questions 
will vary over time, how do actors’ roles, constellations, and resources change? Researching 
institutions, actors, constellations, and resources (Hagmann/Péclard 2010) can bring a given 
analysis closer to measuring what is present – different ongoing negotiations of oligopolistic 
settings – rather than what is absent – a pure monopoly of force. The final analysis of statehood 
can then take on multiple forms. The information could be simplified and assimilated into a 
large dataset for quantitative analysis (see Linke-Behrens, this paper; Stollenwerk, this paper), 
or single case studies could delve deeper into one particular setting. My preferred avenue, 
comparison of a small number of cases, allows for complexity, while at the same time searching 
for theoretical generalizations across cases (Basedau/Köllner 2007). However, as always, the final 
research method depends on the topic of inquiry.
6.2 Specific Findings on Statehood through Qualitative Research
As an exemplification of all these steps, I will describe the data generation process for the cases 
of Bangassou in the Central African Republic and Gumburaha Banka in Somaliland. Secondly, 
I will explain why my analysis judges the former’s statehood to be highly fragmented among 
multiple poles, while the latter shows a degree of monopolization, despite a similarly high 
number of actors.
In the case selection, practical and theoretical issues went hand in hand. In the CAR, I was 
searching for any case that was an administrative center greater than the size of a village but 
far from Bangui. Practically speaking, Bangassou was one of very few cases possible, due to its 
relatively secure environment for research and the possibility to take a UN flight that would 
avoid road cutters barring the ground route. However, this meant that I had to accept the 
presence of UN forces in the locality, which was a variable I wanted to avoid. A down-side to 
selecting Gumburaha as a case was its proximity to the capital, Hargeisa, which stretched its 
commercial and administrative connections into this rural area. Research access to Bangassou 
was negotiated with the UN and the highest local authority, the Prefect. However, contact to 
some of the alleged menaces in the region, such as the ex-Séléka rebels and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, was not possible, thereby biasing the research. In Gumburaha, my access was negotiated 
both through state channels – i.e. I had to be accompanied by state security personnel at all 
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times – and by clan leaders. This meant that access to disgruntled clan members, which could 
cast a bad light on the state or clan leaders, was only seldom and by chance possible. In both 
regions, statehood was assessed through focus groups, interviews, and observations, unveiling 
each locality’s complex web of actors. The UN was a highly resourceful institution in Bangassou, 
which supported state forces, but at the same time, the population organized itself into auto-
defense groups, making it often impossible for the unarmed police and gendarmerie to assert 
its official state authority. In Gumburaha, nine sub-clan leaders negotiated different issues of 
security and society for their respective clans, and the police in the nearby town of Baligubadle 
would intervene on specific occasions. 
The analyses of both cases suggest a strong variation of statehood. Despite the UN mission’s 
resources in Bangassou, which outpaced any local security actors’ capacity twentyfold (in numbers, 
vehicles, weaponry), peacekeepers did not create a situation of a monopoly of force, because both 
their mandate and military tactics led them not to assert their authority on everyday matters. 
Thus, multiple conventional and non-conventional actors continued to hold authority over 
different areas and subjects in Bangassou and its surroundings, at times competing violently. 
In the terminology of the Research Center 700, statehood was limited. In Gumburaha, on the 
other hand, the multiple poles had very clear and habitual patterns of interaction: in the event 
of conflict, the police intervened to halt the violence, then clan leaders of the respective parties 
came together to negotiate a contract of compensation and cohabitation, after which the police 
would release the culprits. Thus, force was monopolized in one institutional setting that was 
seen as legitimate by most interviewed inhabitants. Statehood was, in a specific form, relatively 
consolidated in Gumburaha Banka – a finding numerous authors have established before me in 
other areas of Somaliland (e.g. Ali et al. 2008; Höhne 2011; Leonard/Samantar 2011).
6.3 Advantages and Challenges of Flexibility 
In summary, qualitative analysis of statehood necessitates a large degree of flexibility on the 
side of research design: case selection, accessibility, and data gathering tools have to adapt to the 
contested environment found on the ground, even if this translates into a risk of falling short of 
theoretic standards of analysis. These practical adaptations – when taken with care and regularly 
reflected upon – could contribute to methodological standards of the future, as they call for 
more honest case appreciations, stronger local guidance, and put the emphasis back on the 
research object rather than its tools. Theory development itself benefits when researchers begin 
looking for what is present, rather than for what is absent. Qualitative research concerning the 
monopoly or oligopoly of force includes results on state institutions deliberately perpetuating 
crisis and contestation (de Vries/Justin 2014), alternative institutions that coordinate between 
multiple poles (Höhne 2011), and even entirely new and innovative ideas of what statehood 
locally signifies, beyond the herein proposed definition (Leonard/Samantar 2011). Field research 
in areas of limited statehood, while fraught with methodological and practical constraints, is 
thus a very rewarding endeavor in the search for a deeper understanding of statehood. 
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7. Conclusion
By Angela Heucher, Luisa Linke-Behrens, and Leon Schettler
Our objective with this Working Paper was to offer a “rich and diverse menu of possibilities” 
for measuring statehood on a sub-national level. So what is now on the menu? Stollenwerk 
and Linke-Behrens demonstrate how quantitative data can be used to map and analyze 
varying degrees of statehood within a country, thus enabling a comparison across sub-
national units in Nigeria and Tanzania. While Stollenwerk and Linke-Behrens both construct 
quantitative composite indicators to establish an overall picture of statehood, they choose 
different approaches for operationalization and set distinct foci. Their approaches exemplify 
how quantitative measures enable comparisons between federal states or provinces within a 
state. Through a qualitative content analysis of documents and interviews with international 
organizations (IOs), Heucher and Schettler illustrate how IOs perceive statehood in Colombia 
and thus introduce a perception-based approach to measuring statehood. They conclude that 
it is not perceptions per se that matter, but perceptions by experts on the ground. Pech brings 
satellite imagery to the menu, an approach that permits the researcher to identify changes in 
land use and to grasp developments in particular areas detached from human-made borders 
or administrative units. Pech emphasizes the importance of combining satellite imagery with 
other methods, such as interviews, in order to make sense of and explain these observations. 
Glawion, finally, shows how ethnographically-inspired field research yields in-depth results 
of different actors’ statehood perceptions in Somaliland and the Central African Republic. 
Glawion uses different qualitative approaches for data collection, ranging from interviews to 
focus groups to observation. He then triangulates the data to arrive at a more nuanced picture 
of varying degrees of statehood.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that there is no silver bullet for collecting and analyzing 
data on statehood. The approaches for measuring statehood on a sub-national level discussed 
in this working paper all have their specific merits, while presenting their own challenges and 
practical constraints. We hope to have shown that, despite these limitations, our methods do 
offer promising possibilities to tackling this task and – most importantly – that they lead to 
more fine-grained results and thus to a more complete picture of statehood on a sub-national 
level. In particular, we find the combination of different methods in systematic, mixed methods 
research design promising. In her contribution to this working paper, for instance, Pech 
proposes a combination of different methods: While she can detect significant changes in land-
use via earth observation data, she underlines the necessity to draw on qualitative approaches to 
explain these findings. Hence, satellite imagery can be used to identify particular developments 
over time and can thus serve as an entry point for what to investigate more closely. Furthermore, 
the different approaches could prove particularly useful for analyzing areas of limited statehood 
in their territorial, social, and sectoral dimensions, thus leading to a more nuanced picture overall, 
by combining methods. The quantitative measures discussed by Stollenwerk and Linke-
Behrens therein offer insights into territorial areas of limited statehood, as does the method 
presented by Pech, which takes a view from above to identify particular distinctive features of a 
certain territory. The qualitative methods including interviews, focus groups, and observation 
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introduced by Glawion offer the opportunity to study social areas of limited statehood, as they 
allow the researcher to analyze the state’s capacity in local contexts and from the point of view 
of particular social groups, e.g. in certain rural areas as compared to urban areas. Sectoral areas 
of limited statehood, finally, could be studied through exploring organizational perceptions of 
the state’s capacity in particular sectors, for example. As international organizations in the field 
of development most often work closely with government entities, and as they do so within 
concrete policy fields, the qualitative, perception-based approach presented by Heucher and 
Schettler could also be applied to the realm of sectoral areas of limited statehood, in addition 
to the application to the territorial areas of limited statehood the authors present in their 
contribution.
Hence, the overarching objective of our contribution is to encourage more dialogue among 
researchers from different methodological camps – something we have already begun in this 
working paper through cross-references in our individual contributions. With this in mind, we 
hope that this working paper opens up avenues for future multi-methodical research on the 
role of (limited) statehood for governance on the sub-national level.
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